Swat issue and the problem of internally Displaced People

Swat is a valley and an administrative district in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan located 160 km/100 miles from Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. It is the upper valley of the Swat River, which rises in the Hindu Kush range. The capital of Swat is Saidu Sharif, but the main town in the Swat valley is Mingora. It was a princely state in the NWFP until it was dissolved in 1969. With high mountains, green meadows, and clear lakes, it is a place of great natural beauty that used to be popular with tourists as "the Switzerland of Pakistan".

Swat was a princely state and is now part of Pakistan. Swat was part of the Mughal Empire ruled by local rulers known as Akhwand. From 1926 until 1947, Swat was a princely state in British Raj, and in 1947 it acceded to Pakistan. It lay to the north of the modern North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan until it was dissolved in 1969. It incorporated the current states of Swat, Buner and Shangla.

The Islamic State of Swat was established in 1849 under Sayyid Akbar Shah with Sharia remaining in force but the state was in abeyance from 1863 to 1915. Sayyid Abdul-Jabbar Khan was made ruler by a local jirga and had trouble exercising power. In 1917 another jirga then appointed Miangul Golshahzada Abdul-Wadud. The British recognised the state as a princely state in 1926. Following the independence in 1947, the ruler acceded the state to Pakistan whilst retaining considerable autonomy. The ruler of Swat was accorded a 15-gun hereditary salute in 1966 but this was soon followed by the abolition of the state in 1969. The royal status of the former ruler was abolished in 1972, but the former ruling family are still accorded a high degree of respect by the people of Swat. The mayor of Swat district until 2008 was the grandson of the last ruler, Miangul Jehanzeb. He was killed in a suicide attack by the Taliban.

SWAT ISSUE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL ISSUES IN SWAT

Tribal Area:   The tribal social organization and setup of Swat was altered drastically by the rulers of the state and hence, Swat as a tribal society, receded into the background. The area’s constitutional status as a tribal area however, is significant, as it makes the area constitutionally different from the settled areas and also provides it a separate status. Since Swat is part of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), it is crucial to understand its constitutional status. This is important for explaining why the support for the demand for Islamic laws has increased and why the Taliban have been able to increase their presence even in Swat.

The recent reservations/objections of the federal government over the draft of the proposed Shari Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2008, finalized and approved by the provincial government, is a case in point. It was expected that the president would approve the draft sent to him on 24 November 2008, following which the governor would promulgate the regulation, thereby leading to the normalization of the situation by 1 December 2008. Instead, the objections of the federal government over the draft has led to a stasis for an indefinite period, which to be resolved, will require further meetings at different levels between the federal and provincial authorities to draw up a draft agreeable to all parties.48 Reaching a fresh consensus between the Taliban/TNSM, provincial and federal governments over a modified draft will certainly not be easy, will be time consuming, and possibly cause a further deterioration of the situation.

Judicial Issues

The commonly held belief that Swat’s state judicial system was Islamic and hence, disputes were settled swiftly, as per Islamic laws, is unfounded. Islam clearly states the rules to be followed in an Islamic state,  a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, amputation for theft, and stoning for adultery. In Swat however, there were fines for these crimes and the law of ‘soul for a soul’ or qisas, was rarely observed. The local jargas fixed the fines in their dasturul amals (codes of conduct) or the ruler  sometimes did so himself. To put it in a nutshell – the judicial system and laws of Swat were a synthesis of the traditional codes and those Islamic norms, compatible with these codes and the commands of the ruler. While the ruler was supreme and possessed final authority, the traditional codes held secondary status. Islamic laws were subservient to both of them. Final authority in all sorts of cases was vested in the hands of the ruler, who was neither bound by the codes of conduct made by the local jargas nor the Shariat. The situation however, changed with the merger. Regulation I of the Dir, Chitral and Swat (Administration) Regulation, 1969, divested the ruler of his powers, and delegated these to a person, officer or authority (subject to the general supervision and direction of the provincial government) to be appointed or empowered by the provincial government. All old laws, including regulations, orders, rules, notifications and customs, having the force of law, were kept enforced. This status quo created much confusion and uncertainty as there were no codified laws, rules and regulations; and it was left to the new administrative-cum-judicial officers to define and pronounce the riwaj (customary law/practice). The situation soon became so confusing and difficult for the people that an association named the ‘Justice League’ had to be formed. The government gradually started to extend Pakistan’s laws and created a sessions court for the entire Malakand Division, including Swat. The government’s efforts however, failed to redress the grievances of the people because in the main domain, riwaj, which had not been codified, continued to be enforced. Besides, there was no clear demarcation between civil and criminal matters which were sometimes manipulated for ulterior motives. This is why the people’s resentment and grievances increased; so much so that even the labourers started to demand the abolition of the ‘Riwaj/FCR’ (Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901) and the enforcement of full-fledged Pakistani laws instead. While the government continued to extend Pakistani laws sporadically to Swat; in 1975, it promulgated Regulation I of the Provincially administered Tribal Areas Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Regulation, which was enforced immediately. Regulation II of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedures (Special Provisions) Regulation, 26 July 1975, however, was only published and Section 3 of the Regulation stated that it would ‘come into force on such date as Government [Government of North-West Frontier Province] may, by notification in the official Gazette , appoint in this behalf.’ These two regulations are commonly known as PATA Regulations.. The current scenario is also characterized by prolonged procedures, undue delays, technicalities, high costs, and in some cases, bribery. Additionally, the appointment of women judges is not acceptable to certain segments of society. All this has generated fresh resentment; and promoted and contributed to strengthening the cause of the TNSM/Taliban, evidenced by the support for them among the masses, who lately, have begun to openly state that their demands are not unjust. It might be pertinent to ask why the people of Swat rose up in struggle for a change in the judicial system, while those in the rest of the country, did not? A plausible reason seems to be that they had lived under a judicial system in the Swat state era which was quick, efficient, and cost-effective, and which they believed was in conformance with Islam. Not only in the judicial, but also in all the other areas, the Swatis compare the poststate/present situation, which compares  dismally to what existed during the time of the Swat State—especially in the areas of law and order, health, education, communication, peace and security, etc.

Police’s Role

The police contributed significantly to the creation of the present situation. The indifferent and repressive behaviour of the police towards the people, bribery, torture, and their collaboration with and assistance to criminals, embittered and alienated most people. Instead of providing peace, security and assistance to the people, the police became a source of trouble for them. Blatant police corruption, which included collecting the bhata (sum received as bribery for allowing unlawful activities) even for  day-to-day affairs was an open secret and became the cause for much resentment. Moreover, they insulted and tortured TNSM members, arrested during their agitation in 1994-95, which generated further bitterness towards the police, within the rank and file of the TNSM.

Intelligence Agencies

Foreign and Pakistani intelligence agencies have also played an important role. The Pakistani and American intelligence agencies have supported militant organizations in the area for their own ends. These agencies organized and trained jihadi organizations (forerunners of the Taliban) for armed jihad

(qital) to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Pakistani intelligence agencies did the same (in the name of jihad) in Kashmir. The Taliban — an offshoot and conglomeration of the jihadi organizations that fought the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, also called the Soviet Union) in Afghanistan and India in Kashmir — are not only well equipped, but also well trained. And when America and its allies invaded Afghanistan in 2001, ousted the then Taliban government and installed their own puppet regime; the qital or armed jihad was further strengthened, as the Taliban and their supporters were now faced with new, alien occupation forces from whose grip, Afghanistan, a Muslim country, had to be liberated. Pakistan’s withdrawal of its support from the Afghan Taliban, under US pressure, at a critical juncture in 2001, the provision of logistics and other kinds of support to the invading allies, and being in the frontline in the anti-Taliban and anti al- Qaeda drive in the so-called war on terror; not only caused resentment within the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda, but also, anger amongst their Pakistani counterparts and sympathizers. The presence of the allied occupation forces in Afghanistan; the US/NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) cross-border attacks into Pakistan’s tribal territories, targeting the Taliban and their supporters; the Pakistan government’s support to the allied forces; and its actions and operations against the Taliban — including, terming them terrorists and laying down preconditions to any dialogue with the Taliban, added fuel to fire. These factors combined to make the Taliban more stubborn, zealous, and more than eager to stand firm for their cause and make sacrifices to achieve it. Many believe that the Taliban was the creation of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and army. Not only have they benefited from its struggle in Kashmir and Afghanistan in the past, but also regard the Taliban as useful for the future. Additionally, the manner and way in which the so-called operations (2007-2008) and army action were carried out, hint that something is amiss at the bottom. Furthermore, General Pervaiz Musharraf’s unconstitutional act of 3 November 2007 – of imposing emergency in the country after the insurrection of the Taliban in Swat and Waziristan, strengthens the view that the intelligence agencies had possibly played a role in the entire affair. The Taliban, however, strongly repudiate the contention that they have any connections or a secret understanding with the Pakistan army or that the present fighting is a facade. This is proved by the speech of a Taliban leader, Shah Dawran, given to an FM radio station, in which he exhorted the Taliban to kill those who say that that the present fighting in Swat (between government forces and the

Taliban) is mere pretense; that army men are Muslims; and that the Taliban have made a secret deal with the army. The then federal government (2002-2007) and intelligence agencies, as well as the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) and Pakistan Peoples Party (Sherpao) — ruling partners at the federal level — covertly supported Fazlullah with a view to create problems for the then provincial government of Mutahida Majlas-e-Amal (MMA). The MMA government was more tolerant of the Taliban than others, for it recognized that like the Taliban, it was also engaged in a struggle for an Islamic system, and thus, could not be seen as obstructing those advocating and struggling for the same cause. With regard to remaining indifferent and opposing any move against Fazlullah and his supporters, Qari Abdul Bais (MMA’s member, National Assembly, from Swat) contended: ‘Many of the Taliban voted in favor of the MMA in the 2002 elections; we can’t annoy them, as they are our vote bank.’80 Such a policy boosted support for Fazlullah and made him and his cause famous in a relatively short span of time. .

PRESENT SITUATION

The above mentioned factors made the situation extremely volatile in Swat in 2007; as both the government and Fazlullah refused to budge from their respective stands. The government had to deploy armed forces in the area, which resulted in armed clashes. Simultaneously, the government was talking of a peaceful solution to the situation, with the provincial governor declaring that any army operation would be the ‘last option’. President Musharraf however, asked the other side, the same day, to lay down its arms. The other side also stated its opposition to war and expressed its preference for a peaceful solution of the issue, through negotiations. Despite this however, they also demanded the withdrawal of the armed forces, an enforcement of Islamic laws, and the release of Sufi Muhammad.

The clashes continued, but after some resistance, Fazlullah and his shura (consultative body or aides), after asking their fighters to evacuate the roadside bases to avoid any further losses to the people, went underground. They termed this not as their ‘flight from the fight’, but a change of the war strategy. While the situation seemed to have calmed down by January 2008, heavy and indiscriminate shelling and bombardment caused heavy loss of lives and property of innocent civilians as well as the displacement of a large number of people. Monetary losses worth billions of rupees in different forms were also incurred. In February 2008, general elections were held in Pakistan and the Awami National Party (ANP)-led coalition government was formed in the province. Since the election had been contested on the slogan of ‘restoring peace and order and bringing normalcy to the province’; the provincial government held negotiations both, with Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah’s organizations. Agreements were concluded and Sufi Muhammad was released. Besides other things, the government promised the enforcement of Islamic laws as per the demands of the other side, who in turn, besides other commitments on their part, agreed to support the government in its righteous endeavours and in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. Differences, however, soon emerged on certain points. Each side blamed the other for not honouring the agreements, which, once more, strained their relations and resulted in fresh armed clashes. The government embarked on the second phase of its so-called operation; and the other side sorted out its own strategies. All these, however, again brought untold misery and great losses - of both, life and resources to the people,. Additionally, the unprecedented curfew (which lasted 22 consecutive days during the month of Ramazan), and the severance of electricity and telephone lines, caused immense problems for the local population. While one side resorted to ‘decapitation’, ‘slaughter’ (unprecedented in Swat; but not altogether new in its history), targeted killing and the destruction of government installations (especially educational institutions, bridges, police posts, and police stations); the other resorted ‘to carpet bombing and massive  shelling as invading armies do. The targeted blowing up and destruction of residential houses and bungalows, and shops and commercial markets etc. by both sides have now become routine. If the course adopted by one side generate resentment and brought misery and worry for a majority of the people; the actions of the other, compelled the people to look upon it ‘as an occupying force rather than a protector. Asfandyar Wali Khan says that the Taliban ‘had even bombed and targeted mosques,  Hujras (Jirga) and even funeral prayers’ and that ‘we have to tell the truth. It is equally true that not only does the army do the same, but in fact, does a lot more damage through carpet bombing, massive shelling, curfews, blockades, massive displacements and so forth. The course of action adopted by the government and armed forces has managed to generate sympathy for the Taliban and resentment against the government and the army; because ‘it is the people of the area who are suffering as innocent civilians are being killed in the army action. Delawar Jan observes: ‘The military operation was welcome with a hope that the militants would soon be eliminated. They were garlanded and hugged when Taliban were routed in the major towns in their initial action.’ But, Today….the army’s intention to crush militants is being doubted and instead of winning hearts and minds, the military is alienating people of the valley due to continuing civilian casualties and problems triggered by the military operation. The alienation is caused by the fact that the military could not protect the life and property but instead added to their problems.

In the wake of a conceptually flawed peace agreement, the Taliban takeover of large parts of Malakand division, subsequent military action in the area, almost three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have fled to camps, homes, schools and other places of shelter across Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). The challenge for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government and international actors is to make relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts responsive to needs and empower local communities in Malakand Division. Failure to do so will reverse any gains on the battlefield and boost radical Islamist groups.

The military’s use of heavy force in the ongoing operations, failure to address the full cost to civilians and refusal to allow full civilian and humanitarian access to the conflict zones has already been counterproductive. The public, particularly those directly affected, is increasingly mistrustful of a military that has, in the past, swung between short-sighted appeasement deals with militants and the use of haphazard force. While there is still broad public and political support for moving against the Taliban, it could erode if civilian casualties are high and the response to IDPs’ needs is inadequate. Indeed, it will not be long before the IDPs demand greater accountability from those responsible for their displacement and assurances of a viable return. Almost four years after they responded poorly to the October 2005 earthquake in NWFP and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), overly centralised state relief organs remain ill-equipped to deal with large-scale humanitarian crises. Likewise, despite the transition to civilian rule in February 2008, the military continues to dominate key institutions, further undermining civilian capacity. Relief and reconstruction efforts must ultimately reestablish and strengthen the link between Malakand’s citizens and the state, severed by rising militancy and the military-devised accord between the Awami National Party (ANP)-led NWFP government and the Taliban-linked Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Moham­madi (TNSM) to impose Sharia (Islamic law) in the Malakand area, through the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, which President Asif Ali Zardari signed on 13 April 2009.

As they did in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake, religious extremist groups, while opposing the military campaign, are exploiting relief efforts to advance their agenda. Communities displaced by a badly planned war may be especially vulnerable to jihadi indoctrination. The crisis, however, also presents an opportunity to win hearts and minds of millions of Pakistanis in NWFP, and more specifically in Malakand Division, who have suffered at the hands of the Taliban. Many of them fled the area even before the current operations began because of Taliban abuses, including murder and rape. Mounting opposition from the religious lobby may give the military an opening to again enter into a compromise with the militants, as it has in earlier campaigns. The federal and provincial governments must resist any such efforts and assert civilian control over counter-insurgency policy, relief and reconstruction. Instituting civilian oversight and scrutiny is vital to retaining popular support for the struggle against violent extremism. The international community should help build civilian capacity to respond to the humanitarian crisis and also counsel the military against negotiating another deal that would again allow religious extremists more space to recruit and spread Taliban control.

The Pakistan government should devise a blueprint for reconstruction efforts, including revitalising war-shattered agricultural and tourism sectors; develop mechanisms that will enable IDP communities to hold officials accountable for the distribution of assistance; prohibit jihadi groups banned under the Anti-Terrorism Law, including those operating under changed names, from participating in relief efforts; prioritise police training and other mechanisms to enhance the capacity of civilian law enforcement agencies to maintain security after the military operation ends and bring militant and local criminal networks and allied serving or retired district officials to justice; rescind immediately the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009, reaffirm the jurisdication of Malakand’s civil courts, the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court and abolish the Frontier Crimes Regulations and the Nizam-e-Adl 1999; and build on political and public support for confronting militancy in NWFP by implementing without delay long-term political and constitutional reforms in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), of which Malakand is a part, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), so as to incorporate their districts and tribal agencies, respectively, into NWFP, with full provincial rights.